Chapter 1
From Tangible to Intangible Heritage

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Two popular television programs on the air in Fall 2007—the Travel Channel’s “No Reservations” with Anthony Bourdain and National Geographic Channel’s “Taboo”—play to the public’s fascination with exotic peoples. National Geographic’s website (www9.nationalgeographic.com/channel/taboo/) specifically uses exoticism as an enticement, urging the audience: “Test your boundaries. Push beyond your comfort zone. Understand seemingly bizarre and shocking practices from around the world.” The audience is comprised of comfortably insular U.S. Americans, and the source of their enjoyment is the intangible cultural heritage of others—what used to be known among earlier generations of anthropologists as “primitive customs and traditions.” Whereas National Geographic’s intent is simply to startle an increasingly unflappable public, Anthony Bourdain attempts to more respectfully involve the viewer in the larger cultural world of the distant peoples he visits. In both cases the audience observes practices that recently have come under the protective lens of UNESCO through its 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (hereafter, Intangible Heritage Convention; see Appendix).

What is intangible cultural heritage? William Logan (2007) defines it succinctly as “heritage that is embodied in people rather than in inanimate objects,” and hence the title of this volume as Intangible Heritage Embodied. But beyond this characterization, the question of the meanings and values of intangible heritage becomes vastly complex. Indeed, whether because the convention is still very new, or because of its inherent complexity, most publications on the topic address themselves primarily to questions of definition. UNESCO devotes many pages of its website to explanation and discussion of the convention, defining intangibility as “the practices, representations, expressions, as well as the knowledge and skills, that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage” (Intangible Heritage

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Convention). But intangible cultural heritage may best be understood by examples. UNESCO specifically identifies the following categories of intangible culture:

- Oral traditions and expressions including language
- Performing arts (such as traditional music, dance, and theater)
- Social practices, rituals, and festive events
- Knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe
- Traditional craftsmanship

Furthermore, the Intangible Heritage Convention describes intangible culture as a living force that is “transmitted from generation to generation” and “constantly recreated by communities and groups” in response to their social and physical environment. Intangible heritage is an essential aspect of community identity and “promotes respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.”

Finally, the Intangible Heritage Convention states that intangible heritage is “compatible with international human rights instruments.” This last statement is a particularly important and potentially contentious assertion that will surely be tested in practice. Indeed, Logan (2007) predicts problems in this area and sees “the notion of human rights as a way of limiting the proposed Intangible List.” For instance, there is the question of the human body itself, a site for the assertion of personal autonomy, yet also a site in which social identity and political attitudes are expressed. With respect to human rights, permanent body mutilation (e.g., female genital circumcision, foot binding) and permanent body-deforming adornment (e.g., tattoos, the neck rings of the Karen hill tribes of Thailand) are subjected to scrutiny. There are also social practices such as the Muslim chador or burqa that, to foreign eyes, may seem burdensome and oppressive, but may be embraced by the wearer variously as signs of faith and a rejection of western modes. Conversely, there is the abandonment of social practices, as when the children of a tradition-bearing group prefer to move to the city, rather than remain in the countryside as objects of intangible heritage. In the latter, the community may lose not only its traditional ways, but also its tourism revenues. Could a government take measures to perpetuate their culture by restricting their assimilation, keeping them ethnographically “pure”? Finally, there are some practices that, although traditional, are now widely accepted as abhorrent and have been officially outlawed, such as ritual sati (widow burning) in South Asia.

In this introductory chapter we consider the history and relevance of the concept of “intangible cultural heritage,” asking why the concept emerged when it did, and examining the important role that such cultural behaviors and values play in the well-being of societies. The charters and documents discussed are listed chronologically at the end of this chapter.
The Development of Intangibility as a Concept

There are dozens of official documents (variously known as proclamations, recommendations, conventions, charters, and codes) of UNESCO, ICOMOS, and regional, national, and multinational organizations that deal with cultural heritage, but they overwhelmingly focus on its tangible, monumental form. The earliest such proclamations did not conceive of the issue in terms of heritage per se—as is the prevalent view today—but specifically as a problem of architectural conservation. The urgency and need for conservation has changed according to the pressures of each age, at times couched as the need to save ancient buildings from abandonment and ruin; at other times, a need to restore buildings damaged by war; and in still other moments, a need to save a particular vernacular or obsolete type from disappearance.

When an international congress of architects was held in 1904 in Madrid, the members recommended minimal intervention in dealing with ruined structures and argued that restoration ought to operate on the principle of unity of style, according to a single stylistic expression. Interestingly, this conference suggested that a functional use for historic buildings was important if they were still serving the purposes for which they were originally intended. As such, the architects argued, these “living monuments ought to be restored so that they may continue to be of use, for in architecture utility is one of the bases of beauty.” The architects specifically addressed the issue of “dead monuments, that is, those belonging to a past civilization or serving obsolete purposes” and which “should be preserved only by such strengthening as is indispensable in order to prevent their falling into ruin; for the importance of such a monument consists in its historical and technical value, which disappears with the monument itself.” The value placed on human usage here was a small but significant acknowledgment of the interrelationship of built form and human society.

The 1932 Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments (adopted at the First International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments) reprised the Madrid theme, recommending that “the occupation of buildings, which ensures the continuity of their life, should be maintained but that they should be used for a purpose which respects their historic or artistic character.” Indeed, they could observe creative examples of such adaptation in the spirit of rehabilitation. For example, the Spanish government’s national chain of paradores, beginning in 1928, converted semi-derelict palaces and convents into high-style hotels with the specific goal of enticing more tourism among Spaniards. The restorations may have focused a great deal more on providing modern plumbing than on preservation and site interpretation; however, by inviting the public to experience historic monuments personally by actually inhabiting them, even if only temporarily, they offered an experience that was quite different from the didactic and often chilly encounters with cultural heritage in the museum environment. The paradores fostered a new kind of tourism in Spain among both nationals and foreigners.
At subsequent congresses throughout the twentieth century, other criteria and values in historic preservation were articulated. There were changes in the way that preservation was to be achieved, the nature of the monuments that were to be restored and safeguarded, and finally, a major change in the understanding of the purpose served by historic preservation. All of these have relevance for intangible heritage.

Beginning with the 1904 Madrid Conference and the 1932 Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments, the earliest declarations articulated the need for common cause in the preservation of architectural and material fabric. In these and later statements, one can observe a shift in preservation techniques. While the Athens Charter admits the utility of reinforced concrete in stabilizing shaky structures, it advocates that the new material be concealed in order to preserve the historic character of the monument. But later charters, most notably the 1964 ICOMOS International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, called the Venice Charter, insisted that the difference between original fabric and the new additions be clearly marked through the use of a contrasting material so that “restoration does not falsify the artistic or historic evidence.” Although the preservation goals differed, both attitudes assumed a monument made of permanent materials in which the line between original material and restoration could be clearly drawn (or conversely, obscured).

Permanence was especially valued in the aftermath of the two World Wars, when the distressing sight of destroyed monuments provoked international agencies to take measures to protect them. Some of these preserved monuments became emblematic of much more than architectural history: from places of worship the French cathedrals became symbols of nationhood to the people of France and Francophiles around the world, expanding upon their earlier appropriation as historical artifacts by the state in the nineteenth century (Emery 2009). The notion that cultural monuments deserve stewardship is also indicated in the pan-American 1935 Washington Pact (also known as the Roerich Pact), which argued for the neutrality of historic buildings in times of war. In this, it anticipated the 1954 Hague Convention (Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict). The Hague Convention directly responded to the unprecedented scale of destruction during World War II and addressed the need for preservation of cultural property in times of war. With the aim of providing as much protection as possible, it offered a very broad definition of cultural property: “[M]ovable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above.”
Agreements promulgated in each subsequent decade added further clauses to protect the built environment. In 1964 and again in 1970, portable cultural property was specifically targeted by UNESCO’s “Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property” and the formal convention of the same name. The convention was particularly important in its attempt to hinder the trade in illegally excavated antiquities. While the emphasis was on the object, value was also placed on the group, collection, and archive, which highlighted a regard for qualities that lay not in the material of the building or object but in its relation to other such things.

However, it was only in 1972 that the full-blown concept of “world heritage” took prominence on the global stage with UNESCO’s “Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage” (called the World Heritage Convention). Herein it was explicitly stated that the loss of any specific cultural or natural heritage “constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all nations of the world.” Moreover, because it was a binding convention—an international instrument of law—rather than a policy agreed upon by non-governmental institutions and architects, or by a mere consortium of national bodies, it had a more powerful effect than the previous charters and pacts.

From 1964 onward, the Venice Charter was the most influential of the aforementioned charters because it laid out the theoretical framework for preservation and restoration. But it was not without detractors who pointed out that its definition of heritage was based on western models that privileged permanence and narrowly defined the categories of authenticity. These definitions were gently but firmly criticized in the ICOMOS 1994 Nara Document on Authenticity. The Nara Document advocated stabilization, yet it permitted an array of restoration approaches that would vary according to their suitability for the kind of object being preserved and the values toward preservation and heritage in the context of its own culture. Article 11 stated:

> All judgements about values attributed to cultural properties as well as the credibility of related information sources may differ from culture to culture, and even within the same culture. It is thus not possible to base judgements of values and authenticity within fixed criteria. On the contrary, the respect due to all cultures requires that heritage properties must [be] considered and judged within the cultural contexts to which they belong. (emphasis added)

The Nara Document was a declaration, not a universally adopted ICOMOS charter or UNESCO convention, but it had a resounding impact nonetheless. In the ICOMOS and UNESCO framework, founded on the principle that permanence and authenticity are inseparable, the Nara Document asserted the existence of different heritage values and criteria. By stating that “truthfulness” could be culturally contextualized, it admitted a criterion by which an annually
renewed mud structure or a ritually rebuilt wooden temple could be designated as both historic and authentic. Ephemerality thus took its place alongside permanence as a legitimate characteristic of some kinds of historic structures. The Nara Document also permitted authenticity to be judged not simply in terms of an original, from which later states were understood to be mere copies (and thus inauthentic), but measured instead by the meaning attributed to an object or monument.

The acknowledgment of impermanence and renewal had an impact that far exceeded that of monument preservation because it admitted the human being as integral to the construction of meaning and the ongoing creation of material culture. If a building or a work of art is to be ritually renewed, then the actors who effect the renewal become essential elements in the preservation process. In this period, a shift was occurring from the exclusive emphasis on material culture to a definition that included performed culture—or rather, the complex interdependence of them had been highlighted.

In fact, however, the door to alternative forms of heritage preservation had been opened prior to the Nara Document. On a smaller, national scale, there had been other instruments that insisted on an understanding of the historic monument in terms that were different from those of UNESCO. For example, as early as 1950, Japan had defined its national patrimony to include human beings themselves, identified as “living treasures” (Kurin 2004). But there was a disconnect between, on one side, the international bodies of UNESCO (a branch of the United Nations) and ICOMOS (a non-governmental organization with advisory capacity), and on the other, individual nations. The process by which intangible heritage shifted from a local concern to an internationally recognized value was reached slowly and incrementally.

The 1972 World Heritage Convention had provided a static definition of cultural heritage (monuments, groups of monuments, and sites) and natural heritage (geological or biological formations striking for their beauty or scientific value). It was followed in 1982 by the ICOMOS Florence Charter which specifically emphasized the living nature of historic sites. Article 2 of the Florence Charter underscored that gardens and landscapes themselves are alive and thus in a constant state of balance between renewal and decay. It also included water and the surrounding environment in the materials of the site, thus introducing the question of scale and interdependence. It acknowledged that landscapes are never self-contained, depending as they do upon external water sources (whether from springs, streams, or rain), insects for pollination, and birds and animals for reseeding. But having admitted time into its framework for preservation, it then added that a garden reflects “the desire of the artist and craftsman to keep it permanently unchanged.”

The Florence Charter was full of such contradictions and was undermined by its oddly romantic assumption that all gardens shared meaning as “the cosmic significance of an idealized image of the world, a ‘paradise.’” This attribution necessarily excludes landscapes that commemorate places of pain and shame—such as the WWII cemetery at Normandy or Wounded Knee in the United
States. With such inherent conflicts and assumptions, it is a deeply flawed charter; yet it admitted a different kind of monument into the preservation portfolio that by its very nature (the double meaning is deliberate) required new preservation values and required the participation of landscape architects (Ruggles n.d.).

The focus of heritage preservation had changed by the 1980s to include cultural values that differed from those of UNESCO's primarily western nations, and it had also begun to recognize issues of time and scale. The third major thread that developed continuously was the recognition that monuments, objects, and performances were endowed with meaning by virtue of their relation to the present. From the very beginning, preservationists understood that the purpose of historic preservation is not to make fossils of the past or past ways of life but to integrate safely into the present those parts of the past that continue to have meaning for the current age and may predictably resonate with meaning for future generations. In the simplest sense this meant ensuring the continued usage of old buildings or finding new uses for them. With this idea evidently in mind, Article 5 of the Venice Charter had stated that reusing old buildings for new purposes aided conservation and was permissible. But in a more profound sense, one of the goals of heritage preservation was to maintain the relationship of a resident community to its patrimony so as to prevent the historic building or precinct from becoming a mere fossil. As early as 1931, the Athens Conference had concluded that “the best guarantee in the matter of the preservation of monuments and works of art derives from the respect and attachment of the peoples themselves.” The Declaration of Amsterdam (1975) stipulated that architectural conservation become an integral part of urban and regional planning, and it called for consideration of social factors and cooperation between local authorities and the populace.

With the gradually increasing emphasis on audience reception, the regard for tourism also shifted. Whereas conservators might once have viewed the tourist as a regrettable necessity, sometimes ridiculed for culturally inappropriate behavior and ignorance, they began to recognize in tourism an opportunity for cultural education and even the public’s right to access to historic monuments and works of art. In 1976, ICOMOS drafted a Cultural Tourism Statement that called for a change in “the attitude of the public at large towards the phenomena resulting from the massive development of touristic needs . . . from school age onwards children and adolescents be educated to understand and respect the monuments, the sites and the cultural heritage and . . . information media should express to the public the elements of the problem thereby efficaciously contributing to effective universal understanding.” What these and other documents share in common is recognition of the need for community participation in monument preservation, be it a pyramid mound or entire historic district. This developed into a mandate for an interpretive framework that addressed the question of meaning for living societies, culminating in the 1999 ICOMOS International Cultural Tourism Charter that declared the
importance of making “the significance of that heritage accessible to the host community and visitors.”

The meaning of heritage to living people cannot be underestimated. There has been an increasing recognition of the potential significance of “dead” and “living” monuments for contemporary populations as venues of intangible performances. The attachment that communities feel for places, monuments, and objects—expressed through pilgrimage, religious devotion, story-telling, and tourism—can be a vital means of constructing group identity. The attachment can be so strong that even with the disappearance of a beloved monument, value is not erased. One can reflect upon the Jewish people’s multimillennial longing for an almost physically extinct temple in Jerusalem; the highly charged and vacant site of the demolished Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, or more recently, the enormous significance of the ground where the World Trade Center’s twin towers formerly stood in New York City. These are powerful “lieux de mémoire” (sites of memory) as Pierre Nora (1989) conceived the idea, and memory is vital to intangible heritage.

As we have seen, during the twentieth century concepts of permanence/impermanence, fixed/living, and audience reception came to the fore in heritage discourse. The next important shift occurred in the admission of non-material entities into the purview of heritage preservation.

Although the Florence Charter and Nara Document had introduced the human actor, and the ICOMOS Cultural Tourism Statement had located meaning as emerging from the mind of the observing audience, the primary object of preservation in all of these remained a tangible, physical thing. This changed in 1989 when UNESCO enunciated a “Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore.” It was the first document specifically targeted at intangible cultural heritage and its preservation, and it was promulgated because of awareness of the impact of industrialization and mass media on traditional patterns of culture. The document called for United Nations countries to develop a series of conservation strategies that included documentation of traditions, establishment of archives, creation of folklore museums, and support for transmitters of traditions. The document also recommended scientific research complemented by development of educational programs about folklore. The 1989 document explained the value of traditional culture:

Considering that folklore forms part of the universal heritage of humanity and that it is a powerful means of bringing together different peoples and social groups and of asserting their cultural identity,

Noting its social, economic, cultural and political importance, its role in the history of the people, and its place in contemporary culture,

Underlining the specific nature and importance of folklore as an integral part of cultural heritage and living culture,

Recognizing the extreme fragility of the traditional forms of folklore, particularly those aspects relating to oral tradition and the risk that they might be lost…

However, as Richard Kurin (2003:21) commented, the document was “ill-defined, ‘top-down,’ and ‘soft,’” and a decade later it had not made a discernible impact as an international instrument. Hence, in 1999 UNESCO instituted a
program called “Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage” (adopted unanimously in 2001). Equally important was UNESCO’s 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. That document states that cultural diversity should be understood as contributing to economic growth, and is “a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence” and that “cultural diversity is as necessary for human-kind as biodiversity is for nature.” It states, moreover, that “culture is at the heart of contemporary debates about identity, social cohesion, and the development of a knowledge-based economy” and that while globalization may threaten cultural diversity, it also may foster cultural awareness and interchange. The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity is particularly important to a discussion of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention because it reflects the idea of world heritage that figured eponymously in the 1972 World Heritage Convention dealing with cultural and natural sites. Implicit in the Intangible Heritage Convention is the idea, expressed in the diversity declaration, that each tradition is an equally valuable element of the whole of human-kind’s intangible cultural heritage.

In the 2003 Intangible Heritage Convention, the term “intangible cultural heritage” replaces the older terms “traditional culture,” “oral tradition,” and “folklore.” The convention had gained greater urgency in the intervening decade and a half because of the widespread loss of traditional cultures, languages, and performance as a result of modernization and global mass culture. Moreover, as Kurin (2003) again observed, at least some of the States Parties signing the convention were aware that their national cultural heritage had prestige value. Some intangible cultural heritage can be a key attraction for tourism and its revenue.

The new convention is not without problems. Three powerful members of the United Nations—the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—abstained from the vote, although none of the 190 member states voted specifically against it. Some countries were fearful that practices that they regard as cultural heritage will be regarded as an abrogation of human rights in the west and therefore censured. Since implicit in the concept of intangible cultural heritage is the notion of “inalienable” heritage, UNESCO is in an awkward position of not wanting to promote practices that contravene its (largely western) understanding of human rights as it evaluates the applications of countries seeking to have their customs registered as intangible cultural heritage (Silverman and Ruggles 2007). Kurin (2003) warns that UNESCO must be careful, for instance, that an epic performance tradition denigrating a particular vanquished group not violate the “respect” clause of the convention. Logan (2007:43) has addressed this question by noting that “the right to protect cultural diversity and cultural heritage is a cultural right, part of the panoply of human rights,” that is to say, it is a subset of the larger realm of human rights. He concludes by asserting that the mandate for human rights supercedes individual or regional claims to cultural tradition.
The new convention is politically very sensitive for, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2006) has observed, world heritage implies global policy. But whose world is setting the policy? Amareswar Galla notes that there is a “globalising tendency of World Heritage inscriptions” in which “European’ (including North American) paradigms and their colonial and post-colonial manifestations” are present, although unacknowledged (Galla 2008:10, 18). UNESCO, as the organization that sets and supervises policy, is unlikely to be the most effective critic of this paradigm. Instead, individual cases in real-world settings with real-world outcomes, as documented by heritage managers and scholars, test UNESCO’s criteria at both the local and the national scale. Indeed, the interactions between communities at the local and the national scale, as well as between majority and minority populations, have illuminated one of UNESCO’s most serious shortcomings: its inability to negotiate with any bodies other than nation-states.

The convention has the potential to pit minority enclaves with “certifiable” intangible cultural heritage against the dominant majority in their countries, or to empower those majorities to control traditional cultural expressions. Logan (2007) gives the example of the Myanmar junta’s conservation of Buddhist religious monuments to legitimize the cultural history of the Buddhist majority and thus promote the assimilation of non-Buddhist minorities who sacrifice their distinct heritage in the process. The Myanmar example occurs as a deliberate strategy of oppression. However, the same result can occur as an indirect result of modernization and economic inequalities. For example, in this volume, Janet Keller’s discussion of the Oceanic people of Vanuatu addresses the minority question from a different perspective, showing that assimilation has caused a loss of cultural identity for embattled minority groups. Michael Brown (2004) turns the situation the other way around, and with respect to the U.S. Park Service’s stewardship of parks containing native sites, asks “How can a federal government which is legally prohibited from privileging religious activities of any one group, manage to make a site accessible to Native Americans, without privileging their religious activities over the legitimate activities of other types of patrons?” Instances such as Champaner-Pavagadh in India (discussed by Ruggles and Sinha in this volume), where a site has been historically shared by communities of different faiths, are rare, and the success may lie in the fact that until the site was nominated for UNESCO World Heritage status, it was relatively ignored by the national government of India. India struggles with diversity issues, and it remains to be seen how the complex character of Champaner-Pavagadh will be accommodated in future protective legislation.

Kurin (2003) raises another important concern. The convention urges states to preserve their traditional cultures by “all necessary means,” which has a possible potential for the legitimization of oppressive measures. He asks (as we hypothesized earlier in this essay), could a state force the children of weavers to pursue the family profession rather than becoming lawyers or anthropologists? And he concludes, “The means have to be more ‘appropriate’ than ‘necessary’ when understood in the context of national and international laws and human
rights accords” (Kurin 2003:22). Fear of governmental abuse is a topic which Albro and Chernela (2006) develop in their consideration of cultural rights and human rights from the perspective of policy-making. With respect to the definition of cultural rights, they recognize that it is too easy to “blur ‘rights’ and ‘regulatory’ goals.” They conclude that “Governments and institutions are increasingly moved to adopt the terminology of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural diversity’ as a way to advance state goals and interests. Meanwhile, local activists leverage tools of cultural identity to affirm more immediate, local and indigenous meanings and concerns” (Albro and Chernela 2006:45). The well-intentioned Intangible Heritage Convention is subject to these contradictory forces.

Because the Intangible Heritage Convention was adopted only a few years ago, intangible heritage is a relatively new topic for discussion among scholars and professionals. Intangibility as a heritage criterion was implicitly present in the papers contributed to Cultural Heritage and Human Rights (Silverman and Ruggles 2007). Intangibility also was the subject of a May 2006 seminar at Cambridge University called “Re-visioning the Nation. Cultural Heritage and the Politics of Disaster.” It is the topic of a double issue of Museum International (2004), and is the central theme of the new International Journal of Intangible Heritage, begun in 2006. Much of the literature to date focuses either on the history of the convention (summarized above) or on studies drawn from specific cases. To some extent this is due to the structure of heritage organizations themselves, the largest of which—UNESCO—is organized entirely along national lines. But it is also because heritage preservation and heritage studies are often based on actual experience and thus respond to individual circumstances. Learning is not, in this sense, top down but rather based on comparison of specific case studies and actual practice. For this reason, practitioners and scholars in the different fields of music, theater, anthropology, landscape architecture, and history were asked to brainstorm together in a workshop at the University of Illinois in March 2007. From their efforts have come the chapters for this volume.

The field of intangible heritage studies is growing rapidly, and will have an impact on a wide range of arts and human practices. At first glance, the problems faced in theater history (as in Wong’s contribution to this volume) differ markedly from those encountered in the preservation of sites such as New Philadelphia (Fennell, this volume) or Champaner-Pavagadh (Sinha and Ruggles, this volume), but place and performance are bound together through the human body. This is an aspect of the Intangible Heritage Convention that preservationists will have to deal with constantly (and in many cases already have had to confront), but whose full conceptual ramifications are rarely recognized. The dramatic shift in values implied in the Intangible Heritage Convention is not simply the inclusion of new forms of cultural heritage or a shift from permanence to impermanence. It represents a radical paradigm shift from the objective nature of material culture to the subjective experience of the human being. In this sense, it reflects the philosophy of the postmodern world.
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www.icomos.org/docs/florence_charter.html

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